Can you recognize a low private exponent from a public key?












2












$begingroup$


In the RSA cryptosystem, Wiener, Boneh and Durfee showed that low private exponents can be efficiently recovered. Is it possible to see from a public key alone whether the private exponent (d) is small? Is the public exponent (e) then necessarily large? Is it possible to have a small private exponent when e=65537?










share|improve this question











$endgroup$












  • $begingroup$
    Is it possible? Sure, if you have a very small modulus.
    $endgroup$
    – forest
    Feb 19 at 10:40










  • $begingroup$
    (a) Yes: by running the Wiener–Boneh–Durfee attack! (b) Yes. (c) No.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 16:07










  • $begingroup$
    Qualification on (b) and (c): large/small relative to the exponent of the group, to fend off the goofy counterexamples of forest and poncho.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 19:44
















2












$begingroup$


In the RSA cryptosystem, Wiener, Boneh and Durfee showed that low private exponents can be efficiently recovered. Is it possible to see from a public key alone whether the private exponent (d) is small? Is the public exponent (e) then necessarily large? Is it possible to have a small private exponent when e=65537?










share|improve this question











$endgroup$












  • $begingroup$
    Is it possible? Sure, if you have a very small modulus.
    $endgroup$
    – forest
    Feb 19 at 10:40










  • $begingroup$
    (a) Yes: by running the Wiener–Boneh–Durfee attack! (b) Yes. (c) No.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 16:07










  • $begingroup$
    Qualification on (b) and (c): large/small relative to the exponent of the group, to fend off the goofy counterexamples of forest and poncho.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 19:44














2












2








2


1



$begingroup$


In the RSA cryptosystem, Wiener, Boneh and Durfee showed that low private exponents can be efficiently recovered. Is it possible to see from a public key alone whether the private exponent (d) is small? Is the public exponent (e) then necessarily large? Is it possible to have a small private exponent when e=65537?










share|improve this question











$endgroup$




In the RSA cryptosystem, Wiener, Boneh and Durfee showed that low private exponents can be efficiently recovered. Is it possible to see from a public key alone whether the private exponent (d) is small? Is the public exponent (e) then necessarily large? Is it possible to have a small private exponent when e=65537?







rsa






share|improve this question















share|improve this question













share|improve this question




share|improve this question








edited Feb 19 at 17:09







Sjoerd

















asked Feb 19 at 9:14









SjoerdSjoerd

401312




401312












  • $begingroup$
    Is it possible? Sure, if you have a very small modulus.
    $endgroup$
    – forest
    Feb 19 at 10:40










  • $begingroup$
    (a) Yes: by running the Wiener–Boneh–Durfee attack! (b) Yes. (c) No.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 16:07










  • $begingroup$
    Qualification on (b) and (c): large/small relative to the exponent of the group, to fend off the goofy counterexamples of forest and poncho.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 19:44


















  • $begingroup$
    Is it possible? Sure, if you have a very small modulus.
    $endgroup$
    – forest
    Feb 19 at 10:40










  • $begingroup$
    (a) Yes: by running the Wiener–Boneh–Durfee attack! (b) Yes. (c) No.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 16:07










  • $begingroup$
    Qualification on (b) and (c): large/small relative to the exponent of the group, to fend off the goofy counterexamples of forest and poncho.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 19:44
















$begingroup$
Is it possible? Sure, if you have a very small modulus.
$endgroup$
– forest
Feb 19 at 10:40




$begingroup$
Is it possible? Sure, if you have a very small modulus.
$endgroup$
– forest
Feb 19 at 10:40












$begingroup$
(a) Yes: by running the Wiener–Boneh–Durfee attack! (b) Yes. (c) No.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 19 at 16:07




$begingroup$
(a) Yes: by running the Wiener–Boneh–Durfee attack! (b) Yes. (c) No.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 19 at 16:07












$begingroup$
Qualification on (b) and (c): large/small relative to the exponent of the group, to fend off the goofy counterexamples of forest and poncho.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 19 at 19:44




$begingroup$
Qualification on (b) and (c): large/small relative to the exponent of the group, to fend off the goofy counterexamples of forest and poncho.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 19 at 19:44










2 Answers
2






active

oldest

votes


















6












$begingroup$

When generating keys, $d$ and $e$ are each others modular inverse:




  • $d times e equiv 1 pmod{ lambda(n)}$

  • $d times e = 1 + k times lambda (n)$


Unless $d = e = 1$, this means that $d times e$ is at least $lambda(n)$, otherwise it would not "wrap around" to become $1$. So $k$ is at least $1$:




  • $d times e ge 1 + lambda(n)$


This means that at least one of $d$ and $e$ is at least $sqrt{1 + lambda(n)}$, otherwise they wouldn't multiple to be greater.





  • $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$, or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$


If we set $e = 65537$, it must be $d$ that is large. It is not possible to have a key with a low private exponent that also has a low public exponent. A key with a low private exponent has to have a public exponent that is at least $sqrt{lambda(n)}$.






share|improve this answer











$endgroup$









  • 1




    $begingroup$
    This gives a criterion for ruling out the possibility of a low private exponent, but not a criterion for recognizing a low private exponent.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 15:30










  • $begingroup$
    A different problem w.r.t. the question is: $lambda(n)$ can't be determined from the public key, as asked. And it is possible to craft $n$ so that $lambda(n)$ is much smaller than $n$, or even smaller than $sqrt[k]n$ for sizable $k$. But if $n$ is the product of two distinct primes, we have $lambda(n)>sqrt n-1$ and a slight variant of the reasoning leads to $d>sqrt n/e$.
    $endgroup$
    – fgrieu
    Feb 19 at 18:32





















1












$begingroup$

Sjoerd is quite correct in that we always have either $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$ or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$.



I would alternatively express this as $d > p/e$, where $p$ is the largest prime dividing $n$.



And, if we knew we had a normal RSA key, that'd be the answer.



However, there is something called multiprime RSA, where $n$ has 3 or more prime factors. And, we are unable to distinguish normal RSA and multiprime RSA from just the public key.



Once we allow that as a possibility, the bound on $d$ decreases considerably.



If we take it to the extreme, we find this example:



e = 65537
d = 92056403
m = 3*7*11*23*31*43*47*67*71*79*103*131*139*191*211*239*331*419*443*463*547*571*599*647*691*859*911*
967*1123*1327*1483*1871*2003*2311*2347*2531*2731*2927*3571*3911*4523*4831*6007*6271*7411*7591*
8779*8971*9283*10627*11731*13567*17291*21319*28843*35531*38039*43891*46411*51871*58787*62791*
72931*91771*102103*106591*111827*138139*336491*355811*461891*520031*782783*903211*1193011*
1939939*2348347*2624623*2897311*3233231*5138171*5679031*10546771*13123111*17160991*24609131*
50570411*62469331*83671043*107901571*113201999*130617691*200388631*205256371*232623887*
251013127*353992871*444100147*533666563*657415331*812101291*889444271*960837791*1436794591*
2481736111*3489358291*4035518719*4608938491*4885101607*5773301899*6725864531*9099699071*
13259561503*13805721931*15429924511*15670390867*20177593591*21168773627*27299097211*32262569431*
37472673811*42189513871


This m is a 2228 bit number, yet still has a comparatively small d with the standard e.



Now, such a number must be smooth (as every prime factor must satisfy $p < de$), and so is trivial to factor. However, I believe that is does answer the question "must a small e always imply a large d".






share|improve this answer









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    2 Answers
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    active

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    6












    $begingroup$

    When generating keys, $d$ and $e$ are each others modular inverse:




    • $d times e equiv 1 pmod{ lambda(n)}$

    • $d times e = 1 + k times lambda (n)$


    Unless $d = e = 1$, this means that $d times e$ is at least $lambda(n)$, otherwise it would not "wrap around" to become $1$. So $k$ is at least $1$:




    • $d times e ge 1 + lambda(n)$


    This means that at least one of $d$ and $e$ is at least $sqrt{1 + lambda(n)}$, otherwise they wouldn't multiple to be greater.





    • $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$, or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$


    If we set $e = 65537$, it must be $d$ that is large. It is not possible to have a key with a low private exponent that also has a low public exponent. A key with a low private exponent has to have a public exponent that is at least $sqrt{lambda(n)}$.






    share|improve this answer











    $endgroup$









    • 1




      $begingroup$
      This gives a criterion for ruling out the possibility of a low private exponent, but not a criterion for recognizing a low private exponent.
      $endgroup$
      – Squeamish Ossifrage
      Feb 19 at 15:30










    • $begingroup$
      A different problem w.r.t. the question is: $lambda(n)$ can't be determined from the public key, as asked. And it is possible to craft $n$ so that $lambda(n)$ is much smaller than $n$, or even smaller than $sqrt[k]n$ for sizable $k$. But if $n$ is the product of two distinct primes, we have $lambda(n)>sqrt n-1$ and a slight variant of the reasoning leads to $d>sqrt n/e$.
      $endgroup$
      – fgrieu
      Feb 19 at 18:32


















    6












    $begingroup$

    When generating keys, $d$ and $e$ are each others modular inverse:




    • $d times e equiv 1 pmod{ lambda(n)}$

    • $d times e = 1 + k times lambda (n)$


    Unless $d = e = 1$, this means that $d times e$ is at least $lambda(n)$, otherwise it would not "wrap around" to become $1$. So $k$ is at least $1$:




    • $d times e ge 1 + lambda(n)$


    This means that at least one of $d$ and $e$ is at least $sqrt{1 + lambda(n)}$, otherwise they wouldn't multiple to be greater.





    • $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$, or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$


    If we set $e = 65537$, it must be $d$ that is large. It is not possible to have a key with a low private exponent that also has a low public exponent. A key with a low private exponent has to have a public exponent that is at least $sqrt{lambda(n)}$.






    share|improve this answer











    $endgroup$









    • 1




      $begingroup$
      This gives a criterion for ruling out the possibility of a low private exponent, but not a criterion for recognizing a low private exponent.
      $endgroup$
      – Squeamish Ossifrage
      Feb 19 at 15:30










    • $begingroup$
      A different problem w.r.t. the question is: $lambda(n)$ can't be determined from the public key, as asked. And it is possible to craft $n$ so that $lambda(n)$ is much smaller than $n$, or even smaller than $sqrt[k]n$ for sizable $k$. But if $n$ is the product of two distinct primes, we have $lambda(n)>sqrt n-1$ and a slight variant of the reasoning leads to $d>sqrt n/e$.
      $endgroup$
      – fgrieu
      Feb 19 at 18:32
















    6












    6








    6





    $begingroup$

    When generating keys, $d$ and $e$ are each others modular inverse:




    • $d times e equiv 1 pmod{ lambda(n)}$

    • $d times e = 1 + k times lambda (n)$


    Unless $d = e = 1$, this means that $d times e$ is at least $lambda(n)$, otherwise it would not "wrap around" to become $1$. So $k$ is at least $1$:




    • $d times e ge 1 + lambda(n)$


    This means that at least one of $d$ and $e$ is at least $sqrt{1 + lambda(n)}$, otherwise they wouldn't multiple to be greater.





    • $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$, or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$


    If we set $e = 65537$, it must be $d$ that is large. It is not possible to have a key with a low private exponent that also has a low public exponent. A key with a low private exponent has to have a public exponent that is at least $sqrt{lambda(n)}$.






    share|improve this answer











    $endgroup$



    When generating keys, $d$ and $e$ are each others modular inverse:




    • $d times e equiv 1 pmod{ lambda(n)}$

    • $d times e = 1 + k times lambda (n)$


    Unless $d = e = 1$, this means that $d times e$ is at least $lambda(n)$, otherwise it would not "wrap around" to become $1$. So $k$ is at least $1$:




    • $d times e ge 1 + lambda(n)$


    This means that at least one of $d$ and $e$ is at least $sqrt{1 + lambda(n)}$, otherwise they wouldn't multiple to be greater.





    • $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$, or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$


    If we set $e = 65537$, it must be $d$ that is large. It is not possible to have a key with a low private exponent that also has a low public exponent. A key with a low private exponent has to have a public exponent that is at least $sqrt{lambda(n)}$.







    share|improve this answer














    share|improve this answer



    share|improve this answer








    edited Feb 19 at 12:14

























    answered Feb 19 at 11:19









    SjoerdSjoerd

    401312




    401312








    • 1




      $begingroup$
      This gives a criterion for ruling out the possibility of a low private exponent, but not a criterion for recognizing a low private exponent.
      $endgroup$
      – Squeamish Ossifrage
      Feb 19 at 15:30










    • $begingroup$
      A different problem w.r.t. the question is: $lambda(n)$ can't be determined from the public key, as asked. And it is possible to craft $n$ so that $lambda(n)$ is much smaller than $n$, or even smaller than $sqrt[k]n$ for sizable $k$. But if $n$ is the product of two distinct primes, we have $lambda(n)>sqrt n-1$ and a slight variant of the reasoning leads to $d>sqrt n/e$.
      $endgroup$
      – fgrieu
      Feb 19 at 18:32
















    • 1




      $begingroup$
      This gives a criterion for ruling out the possibility of a low private exponent, but not a criterion for recognizing a low private exponent.
      $endgroup$
      – Squeamish Ossifrage
      Feb 19 at 15:30










    • $begingroup$
      A different problem w.r.t. the question is: $lambda(n)$ can't be determined from the public key, as asked. And it is possible to craft $n$ so that $lambda(n)$ is much smaller than $n$, or even smaller than $sqrt[k]n$ for sizable $k$. But if $n$ is the product of two distinct primes, we have $lambda(n)>sqrt n-1$ and a slight variant of the reasoning leads to $d>sqrt n/e$.
      $endgroup$
      – fgrieu
      Feb 19 at 18:32










    1




    1




    $begingroup$
    This gives a criterion for ruling out the possibility of a low private exponent, but not a criterion for recognizing a low private exponent.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 15:30




    $begingroup$
    This gives a criterion for ruling out the possibility of a low private exponent, but not a criterion for recognizing a low private exponent.
    $endgroup$
    – Squeamish Ossifrage
    Feb 19 at 15:30












    $begingroup$
    A different problem w.r.t. the question is: $lambda(n)$ can't be determined from the public key, as asked. And it is possible to craft $n$ so that $lambda(n)$ is much smaller than $n$, or even smaller than $sqrt[k]n$ for sizable $k$. But if $n$ is the product of two distinct primes, we have $lambda(n)>sqrt n-1$ and a slight variant of the reasoning leads to $d>sqrt n/e$.
    $endgroup$
    – fgrieu
    Feb 19 at 18:32






    $begingroup$
    A different problem w.r.t. the question is: $lambda(n)$ can't be determined from the public key, as asked. And it is possible to craft $n$ so that $lambda(n)$ is much smaller than $n$, or even smaller than $sqrt[k]n$ for sizable $k$. But if $n$ is the product of two distinct primes, we have $lambda(n)>sqrt n-1$ and a slight variant of the reasoning leads to $d>sqrt n/e$.
    $endgroup$
    – fgrieu
    Feb 19 at 18:32













    1












    $begingroup$

    Sjoerd is quite correct in that we always have either $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$ or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$.



    I would alternatively express this as $d > p/e$, where $p$ is the largest prime dividing $n$.



    And, if we knew we had a normal RSA key, that'd be the answer.



    However, there is something called multiprime RSA, where $n$ has 3 or more prime factors. And, we are unable to distinguish normal RSA and multiprime RSA from just the public key.



    Once we allow that as a possibility, the bound on $d$ decreases considerably.



    If we take it to the extreme, we find this example:



    e = 65537
    d = 92056403
    m = 3*7*11*23*31*43*47*67*71*79*103*131*139*191*211*239*331*419*443*463*547*571*599*647*691*859*911*
    967*1123*1327*1483*1871*2003*2311*2347*2531*2731*2927*3571*3911*4523*4831*6007*6271*7411*7591*
    8779*8971*9283*10627*11731*13567*17291*21319*28843*35531*38039*43891*46411*51871*58787*62791*
    72931*91771*102103*106591*111827*138139*336491*355811*461891*520031*782783*903211*1193011*
    1939939*2348347*2624623*2897311*3233231*5138171*5679031*10546771*13123111*17160991*24609131*
    50570411*62469331*83671043*107901571*113201999*130617691*200388631*205256371*232623887*
    251013127*353992871*444100147*533666563*657415331*812101291*889444271*960837791*1436794591*
    2481736111*3489358291*4035518719*4608938491*4885101607*5773301899*6725864531*9099699071*
    13259561503*13805721931*15429924511*15670390867*20177593591*21168773627*27299097211*32262569431*
    37472673811*42189513871


    This m is a 2228 bit number, yet still has a comparatively small d with the standard e.



    Now, such a number must be smooth (as every prime factor must satisfy $p < de$), and so is trivial to factor. However, I believe that is does answer the question "must a small e always imply a large d".






    share|improve this answer









    $endgroup$


















      1












      $begingroup$

      Sjoerd is quite correct in that we always have either $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$ or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$.



      I would alternatively express this as $d > p/e$, where $p$ is the largest prime dividing $n$.



      And, if we knew we had a normal RSA key, that'd be the answer.



      However, there is something called multiprime RSA, where $n$ has 3 or more prime factors. And, we are unable to distinguish normal RSA and multiprime RSA from just the public key.



      Once we allow that as a possibility, the bound on $d$ decreases considerably.



      If we take it to the extreme, we find this example:



      e = 65537
      d = 92056403
      m = 3*7*11*23*31*43*47*67*71*79*103*131*139*191*211*239*331*419*443*463*547*571*599*647*691*859*911*
      967*1123*1327*1483*1871*2003*2311*2347*2531*2731*2927*3571*3911*4523*4831*6007*6271*7411*7591*
      8779*8971*9283*10627*11731*13567*17291*21319*28843*35531*38039*43891*46411*51871*58787*62791*
      72931*91771*102103*106591*111827*138139*336491*355811*461891*520031*782783*903211*1193011*
      1939939*2348347*2624623*2897311*3233231*5138171*5679031*10546771*13123111*17160991*24609131*
      50570411*62469331*83671043*107901571*113201999*130617691*200388631*205256371*232623887*
      251013127*353992871*444100147*533666563*657415331*812101291*889444271*960837791*1436794591*
      2481736111*3489358291*4035518719*4608938491*4885101607*5773301899*6725864531*9099699071*
      13259561503*13805721931*15429924511*15670390867*20177593591*21168773627*27299097211*32262569431*
      37472673811*42189513871


      This m is a 2228 bit number, yet still has a comparatively small d with the standard e.



      Now, such a number must be smooth (as every prime factor must satisfy $p < de$), and so is trivial to factor. However, I believe that is does answer the question "must a small e always imply a large d".






      share|improve this answer









      $endgroup$
















        1












        1








        1





        $begingroup$

        Sjoerd is quite correct in that we always have either $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$ or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$.



        I would alternatively express this as $d > p/e$, where $p$ is the largest prime dividing $n$.



        And, if we knew we had a normal RSA key, that'd be the answer.



        However, there is something called multiprime RSA, where $n$ has 3 or more prime factors. And, we are unable to distinguish normal RSA and multiprime RSA from just the public key.



        Once we allow that as a possibility, the bound on $d$ decreases considerably.



        If we take it to the extreme, we find this example:



        e = 65537
        d = 92056403
        m = 3*7*11*23*31*43*47*67*71*79*103*131*139*191*211*239*331*419*443*463*547*571*599*647*691*859*911*
        967*1123*1327*1483*1871*2003*2311*2347*2531*2731*2927*3571*3911*4523*4831*6007*6271*7411*7591*
        8779*8971*9283*10627*11731*13567*17291*21319*28843*35531*38039*43891*46411*51871*58787*62791*
        72931*91771*102103*106591*111827*138139*336491*355811*461891*520031*782783*903211*1193011*
        1939939*2348347*2624623*2897311*3233231*5138171*5679031*10546771*13123111*17160991*24609131*
        50570411*62469331*83671043*107901571*113201999*130617691*200388631*205256371*232623887*
        251013127*353992871*444100147*533666563*657415331*812101291*889444271*960837791*1436794591*
        2481736111*3489358291*4035518719*4608938491*4885101607*5773301899*6725864531*9099699071*
        13259561503*13805721931*15429924511*15670390867*20177593591*21168773627*27299097211*32262569431*
        37472673811*42189513871


        This m is a 2228 bit number, yet still has a comparatively small d with the standard e.



        Now, such a number must be smooth (as every prime factor must satisfy $p < de$), and so is trivial to factor. However, I believe that is does answer the question "must a small e always imply a large d".






        share|improve this answer









        $endgroup$



        Sjoerd is quite correct in that we always have either $d ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$ or $e ge sqrt{lambda(n)}$.



        I would alternatively express this as $d > p/e$, where $p$ is the largest prime dividing $n$.



        And, if we knew we had a normal RSA key, that'd be the answer.



        However, there is something called multiprime RSA, where $n$ has 3 or more prime factors. And, we are unable to distinguish normal RSA and multiprime RSA from just the public key.



        Once we allow that as a possibility, the bound on $d$ decreases considerably.



        If we take it to the extreme, we find this example:



        e = 65537
        d = 92056403
        m = 3*7*11*23*31*43*47*67*71*79*103*131*139*191*211*239*331*419*443*463*547*571*599*647*691*859*911*
        967*1123*1327*1483*1871*2003*2311*2347*2531*2731*2927*3571*3911*4523*4831*6007*6271*7411*7591*
        8779*8971*9283*10627*11731*13567*17291*21319*28843*35531*38039*43891*46411*51871*58787*62791*
        72931*91771*102103*106591*111827*138139*336491*355811*461891*520031*782783*903211*1193011*
        1939939*2348347*2624623*2897311*3233231*5138171*5679031*10546771*13123111*17160991*24609131*
        50570411*62469331*83671043*107901571*113201999*130617691*200388631*205256371*232623887*
        251013127*353992871*444100147*533666563*657415331*812101291*889444271*960837791*1436794591*
        2481736111*3489358291*4035518719*4608938491*4885101607*5773301899*6725864531*9099699071*
        13259561503*13805721931*15429924511*15670390867*20177593591*21168773627*27299097211*32262569431*
        37472673811*42189513871


        This m is a 2228 bit number, yet still has a comparatively small d with the standard e.



        Now, such a number must be smooth (as every prime factor must satisfy $p < de$), and so is trivial to factor. However, I believe that is does answer the question "must a small e always imply a large d".







        share|improve this answer












        share|improve this answer



        share|improve this answer










        answered Feb 19 at 19:41









        ponchoponcho

        92.6k2145241




        92.6k2145241






























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